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AESTHETICS AND SACRED MUSIC
Gordon Graham
This paper aims to show how philosophical debates about the nature of music 
as an art can throw light on one of the problems raised by Plato’s Euthryphro—
how can human beings serve the gods?—and applies this to the use of music 
in worship. The paper gives a broad overview of expressivist, representa-
tionalist and formalist philosophies of music. Drawing in part on Hanslick, 
Nietzsche and Schleiermacher, it argues that formalism as a philosophy of 
sacred music can generate an answer to Plato’s problem.
My purpose in this paper is to show how philosophical debates about 
the nature of music as an art can be made to throw light on an ancient 
problem about the worship of God. To do that, however, I must begin by 
setting out what I take that problem to be.
I.
Plato’s short dialogue Euthyphro is generally thought important for a di-
lemma that it poses regarding the relation between religion and ethics. 
Is an action good because it pleases the gods, or does it please the gods 
because it is good? This is the issue that forms the centre piece of the ex-
change between Socrates and his interlocutor Euthyphro, but in fact the 
dialogue falls into three distinct parts. The first part effectively shows that 
the multiplicity of gods is irrelevant to the question—which is why Plato’s 
dilemma is usually expressed in terms of God and good. The third, and 
possibly least discussed part, raises a question about the intelligibility of 
worship. How could human beings ever meaningfully serve God?
I am not quite clear [Socrates says to Euthyphro] about the thing which you 
call “service.” I suppose you do not mean the sort of care we give to other 
things. The service of [God] is not like that—the sort of thing that we have 
in mind when we assert that it is not everybody who knows how to care for 
horses.1
Euthyphro, of course, can only agree. The service of God must indeed 
be radically different from anything as mundane as veterinary care. At 
the same time, Euthyphro has difficulty seeing any grounds on which he 
1Plato, “Euthyphro,” trans. Lane Cooper, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Ham-
ilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 181.
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could deny the general claim that “care is given for the good and the wel-
fare of the object that is served.” The problem is that subscribing to this 
general principle seems to bring with it an absurd result. If holiness is the 
service of God, and if service aims to benefit its object, then it seems to 
follow that “when you do a holy thing you make some deity better.”
This is an implication that Euthyphro emphatically rejects. Yet it is easy 
for Socrates to press the point. It seems obvious that the practice of wor-
ship includes such things as sacrifice and prayer. So much, at any rate, 
Euthyphro concedes. But if sacrifice is properly described as “giving to the 
gods,” and prayer is “asking them to give,” then worship is, as Socrates 
alleges, a “mutual art of commerce” between God and humanity. This, 
though, makes it impossible to avoid the question that Socrates poses: 
“What advantage could come to God from the gifts which He receives 
from us? Everybody sees what He gives us. Every good that we possess 
is given by Him. What advantage can He gain by what He gets from us? 
Have we so much the better of Him in this commerce that we get all the 
good things, and He gets nothing from us?” “Are you suggesting,” a hor-
rified Euthyphro asks, “that God gains anything by what He gets from 
us?” Yet if He does not, Socrates responds, we are at a loss to explain the 
meaning of the gifts we offer Him.2
The dialogue does not end quite there. Euthyphro asserts that worship 
is not beneficial to God, but it is nevertheless pleasing. This claim simply 
returns the debate to the earlier dilemma, however. Are acts of worship 
good only because they please God, and not because they have any in-
trinsic value in themselves? If that is indeed the case, then anything that 
pleases will be a fit form of worship. Satanic practices will be as good 
as angelic ones, provided only that God is pleased by them. Accepting 
this horn of the dilemma, however, implies that there need be nothing 
worshipful about God. So why go in for divine service at all?
The problem Plato here identifies is a real one. What is it that we give 
God when we give Him “thanks and praise” which, the ancient Sursum 
Corda says, it is “right, and a good and a joyful thing always and every-
where” to do? What does God get from our praises? Euthyphro is surely 
correct in rejecting the idea that God gets anything. Since God is the sum 
of all perfections, He can lack nothing. Consequently, He cannot lack any-
thing that we might give Him. But if God gets nothing from our worship, 
what is the point of engaging in it? And wherein lies the obligation to do 
so? On the other hand, Socrates is surely also correct in his contention 
that we must have commerce with God. A one-way transaction would not 
constitute anything properly called a relationship; if we are the sole ben-
eficiaries (even on some refined spiritual plane), we can no more enjoy a 
relationship with God than we can with the air we breathe.
2Ibid., 184. I have substituted “God” for “the gods” here.
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II.
Music plays a large part in the practice of giving God thanks and praise. 
To question the intelligibility of worship is thus to question the intel-
ligibility of sacred music. To ask—what does God get from our music 
making?—is just to make a specific application of a more general ques-
tion, and it thus presents us with a no less troublesome problem. Indeed it 
might be thought more troublesome. Some historical conceptions of what 
rightful worship includes fall very evidently foul of Socrates’s challenge, 
but they are relatively easy to abandon. There is, after all, biblical prec-
edent for doing so. “Your countless sacrifices, what are they to me?” Isaiah 
hears God declare. “I have no desire for the blood of bulls, of sheep and 
of he-goats when you come into my presence. Who has asked you for all 
this?”3 Who indeed? In pointed contrast to these barbarous practices, the 
Christian tradition of sacred music seems gloriously edifying, something 
that takes us into spiritual realms far removed from the blood and gore of 
ritually slaughtered animals. If the music of Bach or Tavener cannot be an 
adequate vehicle of divine worship, what could possibly serve this func-
tion? Nothing, it seems safe to say.
Perhaps we can approach the issue by asking what it is that anyone gets 
from music. Human responses to music might enable us to say some-
thing about God’s response. What does an audience get from music? It is 
tempting to regard this as a quasi-empirical question, one that turns on 
the observed effect of music on listeners. But this cannot be quite right. 
While it is true that in matters of programming, say, the expectations and 
reactions of audiences are of considerable importance, there has to be 
more to the matter than this. Though we may need to know what kind 
of music people want to hear, we also need to know which music is most 
worth hearing. This second requirement, however, must have a different 
kind of resolution. To be able to identify the best in music, we have to have 
some understanding of what it makes sense to expect from music. To get 
this right requires us to have some conception of the nature of music, and 
this is a philosophical question, not an empirical one.
What should we expect music at its best to give us? It is widely supposed 
that there is an obvious answer to this question. Music provides us with 
profound emotional experiences. It does so because, the same supposition 
goes, its distinctive function is the communication of emotion. It is important 
to see the force of “communication” here. Music can have quite contingent 
emotional effects, and these can no more count as communication than an-
gering someone can be called “communicating anger.” Similarly, the power 
of a national anthem to arouse patriotic feeling depends on its being heard 
by those whose anthem it is. The music, in this case, does not communicate 
emotion; it simply triggers it. And, as this example suggests, music can have 
contrary emotional effects. The very same anthem that arouses pride in the 
3Isa.1:11, Revised English Bible.
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hearts of some, might engender fear in the hearts of others. So it is the com-
munication, and not merely the causing of emotion that matters.
I shall call the idea that the communication of emotion is essential to 
music “expressivism.” The basic idea is that composers deliberately invest 
music with emotions that they employ their mastery of this distinctive 
medium to convey. Though it is a recognizable view in philosophical 
aesthetics, it also strongly influenced the composition of music in the 
Romantic era. Indeed, the existence of so much wonderful music created 
under this influence explains expressivism’s continuing plausibility. Who 
could listen to Schubert, Tchaikovsky, or Mahler and fail to think in terms 
of emotional experience? Yet an earlier period found an alternative answer 
equally persuasive, and one that has never entirely lost its plausibility. This 
may be called “representationism,” a conception of music that regards it as 
a distinctive medium for the communication of thoughts and ideas, rather 
than feelings. It is this conception of music that underlies Beethoven’s am-
bitious contention that “Music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and 
philosophy,”4 a “higher” revelation because, perhaps, it communicates 
“thoughts too definite for words” as Felix Mendelssohn held.5
It is easy to see how both expressivism and representationism, in their 
different ways, might be called upon to forge the connection between art 
and faith that sacred music seems to require. For those to whom the heart 
of religious faith lies in an emotional response to the sacred, the effec-
tive communication and expression of that emotional response will have 
evident importance. If music has distinctive properties that allow it serve 
this function, then it will have special value in religious worship. To those 
for whom, alternatively, faith is the apprehension and affirmation of deep 
theological truths, the idea that music is a form of revelation has obvious 
appeal. J. S. Bach’s sacred music, it has often been claimed, is especially 
remarkable in this respect, because its harmonic structure is to be inter-
preted as embodying theological doctrines.6
Plausible though these suggestions may be, the extent to which expres-
sivism and representationism about music in general can be applied to the 
use of music in worship is a debatable matter. But it is not the most critical 
issue. The main question concerns their philosophical adequacy. For, if 
they are defective as philosophies of music, they are equally defective as 
philosophies of sacred music. How well do they fare on this score? It is 
relatively easy to point to a number of obvious difficulties. At the heart of 
expressivism lies the contention that musical composition originates in an 
experience of emotion which the music then evokes in those who listen to 
4As reported by Bettina von Arnim in a letter to Goethe, 28 May 1810.
5Letter to Marc-André Souchay, October 15, 1842.
6On this issue see the essays by Robin Leaver and John Butt in The Cambridge Companion to 
Johann Sebastian Bach, ed. John Butt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Calvin 
R. Stapert, My Only Comfort: Death, Deliverance, and Discipline in the Music of Bach (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans, 2000); and Karol Berger, Bach’s Cycle, Mozart’s Arrow (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2007).
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it.7 Now how should we treat this claim about the origins of music? If it is 
an empirical generalization, then we simply lack sufficient evidence, since 
the psychological circumstances under which the vast majority of music 
was composed is unknown. If, instead, it is supposed to be a necessary 
truth about music, then it amounts to no more than a dogmatic claim that 
asserts what it ought to show. Even if in some way this generalization 
about composers could be sustained, there seems no reason to accede to 
the second claim about the audience. Why should we suppose that the 
communication of the emotion requires that it be invoked? I can understand 
from the things that someone tells me that they are grief stricken, and my 
understanding this explains how it is possible for me to sympathize with 
them in their grief. But this successful communication of emotion does not 
require that I grieve myself. And then there is this further point. If music is 
indeed the communication of emotion from composer to listener, it has to 
be regarded as a rather limited form of communication, because the range 
of emotions that music is commonly thought to express and elicit is small. 
Joy, sadness and excitement are plausible candidates, but there is nothing 
much beyond them. Does anyone think that music can evoke jealousy, 
envy, shame or embarrassment?
Representationism about music does not fare much better. Just what a 
piece of music “says” turns out to be highly elusive, once any connection 
with words is severed. It is no accident that in his once famous book The 
Language of Music, Deryck Cooke rests his case for music as a language 
entirely on examples of musical phrases accompanying words. Without 
words, it seems impossible to disambiguate alternative meanings.8 Even 
if we can plausibly interpret (some) compositions as having semantic con-
tent—that is to say, as representing scenes, objects or people—there is no 
obvious equivalent of the syntax by which this semantic content can be 
given different meanings. Nicholas Wolterstorff contends that “there is 
probably no better way to apprehend the character of angels than to listen 
with care to Messien’s [Les Anges].”9 Even if this is true, however, the 
music cannot tell us whether or not to believe in their existence.
These remarks amount to no more than a brief indication of a few of the 
philosophical problems that confront expressivism and representationism 
in music. Taken together with a good many others, I believe them to be 
insurmountable. But there is not the space here to consider the arguments 
fully, nor indeed would it be entirely germane to do so.10 Instead I shall 
focus on just two objections that apply equally to both conceptions. The 
7The plainest articulation of this conception is Tolstoy’s What is Art?, where he defends an 
expressivist account of the arts, including music, having first rejected all forms of “aestheti-
cism” that make beauty central to art.
8Though disambiguation can work the other way around—when music resolves the am-
biguity of words.
9Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art in Action (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans, 1980), 98.
10A more extended discussion will be found in Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 3rd 
edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).
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first of these was famously articulated by Eduard Hanslick in his nine-
teenth-century classic Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, On the Musically Beautiful. 
“Whoever wants to learn about the objective nature of music,” Hanslick 
writes on the opening page, “wants to get out from under the dubious 
authority of feeling.” Hanslick thinks that what I have called expressivism 
and representationism about music are commonly intertwined. The first 
claims that the aim of music is to arouse feeling, while the second claims 
that it is feeling that music chiefly represents. The difference, however, is 
not ultimately a significant one because they both founder on the same 
mistake. They attribute non-musical content to music and thereby neces-
sarily fail to do justice to its being music. In affirming the general truth that 
“every art has as its goal the externalization of an idea actively emerging 
in the artist’s imagination” they fail to see that “in the case of music, this 
idea is a tonal idea, not a conceptual idea translated into tones.”11 Nor, we 
can add, is it an emotional experience translated into tones. “The material 
out of which a composer creates . . . is the entire system of tones, with their 
latent possibilities for melodic, harmonic and rhythmic variety. . . . The 
content of music is tonally moving forms.”12
Hanslick’s principal contention is that the content of music is music. 
This might sound like an empty platitude, but its utter obviousness is its 
strength. Expressivism and representationism, in their different ways, 
look for the significance and value of music beyond the music—in the 
emotional state of the composer and/or audience, or in the revelatory 
ideas represented, whether the ideas are representations of emotion or 
of something else. But if the ultimate “meaning” of music is non-musical, 
then it can in principle be presented to us in some other medium—words 
or pictures or gestures perhaps. In that case, though, the meaning of music 
can be “accessed” without actually listening to music, and for Hanslick 
this is an absurd conclusion, as indeed it must be for anyone. It might 
well be the case, of course, that, as in reviews of concerts for instance, 
words can be used to convey a lot about the music, and even to capture 
some ideas and emotions that the music suggests. Accordingly, those who 
have not (yet) heard it are not all equally ignorant. Nevertheless, if what 
marks out music is the special form of expression that it gives to emotions 
and/or ideas (when it does do this), then no other medium will ever be a 
satisfactory substitute.
The concepts of emotional experience and revelatory wisdom are in-
voked by expressivism and representationism to explain the value and 
significance that we find in music, and to explicate the sense in which we 
can speak of its profundity. If Hanslick’s rejection of all such appeals is 
warranted, how then are these things to be explained? At one level, there 
is no explanation. Human interest in the system of musical tones with 
11Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 31–32.
12Ibid., 28–29.
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its amazing possibilities for melodic, harmonic and rhythmic invention 
is just a “given,” Hanslick thinks. At another level, though, there is an 
explanation. The value of music lies in its unique ability to create beautiful 
sound, a form of beauty that is available nowhere else.
Art should not slavishly imitate nature; it has to transform it. . . . The painter 
is moved to artistic representation by the occasion of encountering a delight-
ful landscape, a group of people . . . the poet by an historical event or per-
sonal experience. But what is there in nature that a composer could point to 
and exclaim: “What a splendid prototype for an overture or a symphony!” 
The composer cannot transform anything; he must create everything new 
. . . which has no counterpart in nature and hence none in the other arts, 
indeed none in this world.13
Even the purest phenomenon of the natural auditory world, namely bird-
song, stands in no relation to human music.14
I shall call the view that Hanslick is expounding here “formalism.” By this 
account music properly so called is pure form. It has neither expressive nor 
representational content. Deryck Cooke voices a common objection to for-
malism when he writes that “by regarding form as an end in itself, instead 
of a means of expression, we make evaluations of composers’ achievements 
. . . largely irrelevant and meaningless.”15 But underlying Cooke’s objec-
tion is the supposition that what is purely formal is necessarily contentless 
in the sense of “empty.” This is false. The formalist’s contention is that 
music’s form is its content—or perhaps it would be better to say that, while 
form and content are distinguishable in music, they cannot be separated. 
It is natural and in no way improper to describe some musical sounds in 
non-formal terms—a sad chord, a jaunty melody, a bright sound. Yet the 
only way to specify the precise content of a piece of music is in formal 
terms—the melodic intervals, the chord sequence, rhythm, modulations of 
key, instrumental timbre, and so on. It is in such terms that we analyse and 
identify musical forms. These forms exist as music, however, only insofar 
as they are filled with tonal content. A Gm chord is a harmonic structure 
distinguishable from its tonal content. But the tonal content is nevertheless 
inseparable from the structure because, arranged in a different structure, 
the tonal content necessarily sounds different.
III.
This very brief consideration of recurrent issues in the philosophy of music 
can at best be expected to unsettle expressivism and representationism. 
Much more would need to be said before it would be reasonable to think 
that they had been dislodged. Nevertheless, some indication has been 
given, I hope, of the basis on which one might prefer a formalistic theory of 
13Ibid., 74.
14Ibid., 71. I think that Hanslick is right when he says that the “song” of the birds is not 
music, but I shall not argue the point here.
15Deryck Cooke, The Language of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 5.
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music. The main consideration operating in its favour is that it gives proper 
weight to the uniqueness of music. This uniqueness has a double aspect. 
Music is for listening to as nothing else is, and listening to it is ineliminable 
from understanding it. Since there is nothing that music stands for, there is 
nothing that can replace it. Though the language of emotion can be used 
to describe it, music is not a medium for the expression of emotion. And 
though music can be described as profound, it is not a medium for the 
revelation of ideas either. Music has no content other than itself.
Hanslick is fiercely critical of any conception of music that seeks to find 
non-musical content in it. Yet in a different way, he shares with those he 
criticizes another erroneous belief about music, namely that it is a pro-
ductive art. His assumption, in general, is that just as painters produce 
pictures, and poets produce poems, so composers produce music.
The starting of all the creative activity of the composer is . . . the devising of 
a particular melody. Through this deep-seated, mysterious power, into the 
working of which the human eye will never penetrate, there resounds in the 
mind of the composer a theme, a motif. We cannot trace this first seed back 
to its origins; we have to accept it simply as given.16
Hanslick is here subscribing to a view that implicitly takes “art” music 
to be music’s ideal type and that musical performances are secondary to 
musical works. The emergence of this view over several centuries was the 
result of some important technical achievements and cultural develop-
ments.17 The historical origins of music are a matter of speculation, but 
it certainly existed for a great many centuries before anyone invented an 
effective means of writing it down. Whereas hitherto music was simply 
made, and repeated only insofar as it was remembered, the creation of 
musical scores established the possibility of playing music that musicians 
did not improvise for themselves and had never heard previously. It was 
thus that the idea of “a composition” became possible. Since several com-
positions could come from a single and identifiable source, the existence 
and role of named “composers” became increasingly important. With 
the rise of the concert hall, music became the object of special attention 
for which space and time was set aside. People were attracted to attend 
these occasions by impresarios who advertised “programs” of music in 
advance. Their success, both commercial and artistic, then came to turn 
on “name recognition.” The fame of individual composers grew, to the 
point where first they equalled, and then they overshadowed the fame 
of the performers. It is easy to see how, at the end of this trajectory, “the 
composer” becomes the principal artist in music, and the direct equivalent 
of the painter and the poet. Wolterstorff, in Art in Action, expresses (and 
endorses) just this view.
16Ibid., 32
17On this see Karol Berger, “The Genealogy of Modern European Art Music,” chapter 3 of 
A Theory of Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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The fundamental fact about the artist is that he or she is a worker in stone, in 
bronze, in clay in paint, in acid and plates, in words, in sounds and instru-
ments, in states of affairs. On some bit of the concrete materials of our stage 
he imposes order.18
This belief in the fundamental unity of all the arts is widely endorsed, but 
in The Birth of Tragedy the philosopher Nietzsche protests against precisely 
this assimilation.
Unlike all those who seek to infer the arts from a single principle, the nec-
essary spring of life for every work of art, I shall fix my gaze on those two 
artistic deities of the Greeks, Apollo and Dionysus. For me they are the vivid 
and concrete representations of two worlds of art . . . the Apolline plastic arts 
and Dionysiac music.19
Among the Apolline arts we may include painting, sculpture and poetry. 
In each case the artist creates an object that embodies a visual, sculptural or 
literary image which the audience is invited to contemplate with interest 
and delight. Music and dance, by contrast, are Dionysiac arts because they 
are not for contemplation, but for participation. In more ordinary parlance 
they are performing arts. The pulsating rhythms of dance music do not 
invite us to stop and listen; they invite us to take to the floor.
The validity of Nietzsche’s distinction has been widely discussed.20 
However we interpret it, though, Apollo and Dionysus must not be un-
derstood to symbolize the different arts in a way that allocates them to 
mutually exclusive categories. Many people’s experience of music, after 
all, is Apolline. What they enjoy is listening intently to a sonic object ex-
pressly created by a named individual, as something to be listened to. The 
audience in the concert hall seems no less engaged in “contemplation” 
than the people who stand looking at paintings in the art museum. In 
both instances the object to which they give such close attention is a work 
originating from the imagination of an individual with a mastery of a par-
ticular medium.
It is a mistake, though, to treat this Apollonian engagement with the 
music of the concert hall as the paradigm of musical engagement. Music 
is not simply written to be listened to; it is written to be played. Indeed, 
though the invention and widespread use of recording tends to obscure 
this important fact, music has to be played. A score is not music until players 
literally realize it, that is to say, give it real existence as music. Without 
this realization, the listener would have nothing to contemplate. The point 
is one to be made about the performing arts in general, a classification 
which includes drama no less than music, as well as some kinds of poetry 
perhaps. Though people are often content simply to read Shakespeare, for 
18Art in Action, 91.
19Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin 
Books, 1993), 76.
20See for instance, Julian Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1992).
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instance, his characters require the realization that only the actor’s appear-
ance, voice and gesture can give them.
To this obvious, if not always evident, fact about the performing arts 
in general, we can add some further relevant observations about music in 
particular. While it may be true that most music—“pop” as well as “clas-
sical”—is written to be listened to, there is nevertheless a great deal of 
music that is not composed for this purpose. John Phillip Souza wrote 
music for marching to; Johann Strauss wrote music for dancing to; movie 
sound tracks are written, we might say, to be “watched to.” More impor-
tantly for present purposes, most sacred music is not written to be listened 
to. Bach wrote a large majority of his works, not as concert pieces, but for 
use in church, a point that needs to be emphasized to a world that now 
mostly hears them at concerts.
It is also relevant to observe that music need have neither composer 
nor audience and still be a valuable enrichment of experience. Jazz musi-
cians who improvise together follow no composition and are not playing 
for anyone other than themselves, yet they are undoubtedly engaged in 
music making. The same is to be said of sacred music. It may be true, as 
Wolterstorff contends, that in the case of liturgical action, the importance 
of the accompanying music lies in the fact that it “lends specificity to the 
action and even to the words by which the action is accomplished,”21 but 
the organist who improvises during the distribution of communion may 
simply be filling a sacred space with spontaneously invented music that 
serves as a fitting aural context for a sacred ritual. Great musical skill is 
required for this. Still, to improvise with the kind of artistry that draws 
the attention of communicants away from the reception of the elements 
and into contemplation of the music would constitute failure, not success.
The conclusion I want to draw at this stage, then, is twofold. Following 
Hanslick, we may say music is a formal, rather than an expressive or 
representational art. Following Nietzsche, we may say that it is paradig-
matically a performing art. That is to say, making music is primary, while 
composing music and listening to it are both secondary. This puts us in 
a position to return to the original question about the place of music in 
worship. We can address this question most satisfactorily, I shall argue, if 
we think of sacred music in terms of aesthetic formalism and ritual action.
IV.
The opening stanza of a hymn by William Walsham How runs as follows.
We give Thee but Thine own
Whate’er the gift may be,
All that we have is Thine alone,
A trust, O Lord from Thee.
21Art in Action, p.116.
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These are, no doubt, suitably humble sentiments to sing, but they do invite 
the question that Socrates presses in the dialogue with which I began. If, 
whatever the gift we try to present, it is already God’s because everything 
is God’s, what is the point of giving it. Indeed on what grounds can we 
intelligibly call it a gift? To model musical artists on painters or sculptors 
is to think of them as people who make aesthetically valuable objects out 
of sonic materials. Conceived in this way, though, Plato’s problem returns. 
Human beings may delight in their artworks, but the “materials” out of 
which they are made, and (according to Wolterstorff) the nature of those 
materials, flow from God’s own creative activity. If so, then we are “giving” 
God that which he already possesses. Beautiful objects are already present 
in the world that God has created. Could anyone suppose that human 
artworks might in any sense improve upon or exceed them?
Faced with this question it is worth recalling Hanslick”s contention 
about music—“The composer cannot transform anything; he must create 
everything new . . . which has no counterpart in nature and hence none 
in the other arts, indeed none in this world.” If this is true, composition 
is a uniquely pure form of creation. Though Hanslick does refer to the 
“materials” composers use, this passage seems to assert that musical com-
position is creation ex nihilo. This accords, of course, with the unity of form 
and content by which, formalists claim, music is uniquely characterized. 
Whether or not this claim to uniqueness is warranted, if formalism is right, 
then a musical offering is not giving God back his own in the re-ordering 
of pre-existent materials. Rather, it is calling something wholly new into 
existence.
Even if this is true, however, it does not seem to resolve Socrates’s 
problem entirely. Musical creations may be ex nihilo and not, therefore, 
simply the re-presentation of things that God has already given. Never-
theless there remains the question of what makes their presentation in the 
context of divine worship a kind of “service.” How could what human 
beings make benefit God? This question, however, rests upon the supposi-
tion that what is made is an art object. Its focus is on an Apollonian musical 
work. What if we shift the focus to a Dionysian musical performance?
Here it needs to be repeated that music exists only in performance—a 
truth that the invention of sound recording has hidden, but not falsified; 
and performance is action. A song is something we sing, and singing is 
something we do. Worship, too, is something we do. It is action, but it is 
action of a special kind, namely ritual action. The use of the term “ritual” 
here should not be understood restrictively as referring only to highly 
ritualistic styles of worship. Its meaning in this context is derived from a 
contrast with technical and ethical action. Technical actions are those ac-
tions whose intelligibility lies in the consequences that are supposed to 
flow from them. Serving food and administering painkillers are obvious 
examples. It is pointless to serve food that does not nourish, or administer 
pain killers that don’t kill pain. Ethical actions are actions whose intelligi-
bility relies on their being in accordance with moral rules. Telling the truth 
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and keeping promises are obvious examples. The requirement to keep a 
promise does not derive from the prospect of future benefits, but from 
the implications of past actions. Ritual actions are neither of these things; 
they do not flow from past commitments or look to future consequences. 
Rather their meaning derives from the structuring symbols they invoke.
A simple example is the practice of pledging allegiance to the flag. This 
might be described as a way of opening the school day, but “opening” here 
means something quite different from the technical task of turning the key 
in the lock to open the school doors. And though it can be laid down as 
a rule that the pledge of allegiance must be said each morning, failure 
to observe this rule would not normally qualify as immoral behaviour 
(though special circumstances might make it so). In short, pledging alle-
giance is a ritual act. Like the British military’s “last post,” a bugle call that 
signals the end of the day, it does not bring about consequences in time. 
Nor does it flow from any fundamental moral principle by which human 
interaction needs to be governed. Rather it structures the time—and the 
space—within which these consequences and interactions take place. It 
helps give meaning to the otherwise meaningless flow of time, and to the 
organization of otherwise undifferentiated space.22
Ritual acts such as the pledge of allegiance and the last post generate 
meaning through the use of symbols that are drawn from and related to 
important aspects of human life, in both these cases the identification of 
political communities and their maintenance. Viewed in this light, the 
worship of God is ritual action par excellence. There is not space here to 
do more than assert this. The thought underlying it is one that Schleier-
macher articulates at length in his speeches On Religion, whose purpose, 
he argues, is “to relate us and our appearance directly to the universe.”23 
Characteristically, worship takes the natural structures of human time—
birth, maturity and death—and the natural structures of space—habitat, 
home and nation—and relates them to the imponderable vastness of 
cosmos and eternity.
Schleiermacher’s reflections on religion give us a context in which 
philosophical formalism appears to be the best explanation of music’s 
peculiar virtue as a mode of worship. If, as Hanslick alleges, music has 
no counterpart in nature or “this world,” and if, as I have argued, the 
reality of music lies in its being brought into existence ex nihilo by en-
actment, then it provides us with a mode of activity that transcends this 
world. On this account, worship is not action aimed at presenting God 
with something beneficial, or which He finds pleasing. Rather it is action 
that enables human beings to reflect divine activity. That is to say, worship 
is action that both takes place in time and space and is beyond time and 
22For further elaboration of this theme see Gordon Graham, Wittgenstein and Natural Reli-
gion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chap. 8.
23Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, ed. Richard 
Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 44.
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space, action that enables us, in Schleiermacher’s phrase “to be eternal in a 
moment.”24 Or, employing the language of the seventeenth-century theo-
logian Henry Scougall, “true religion is an union of the soul with God, a 
real participation of the divine nature.”25
These remarks are, to say the least, sketchy.26 The conceptions of God 
and music towards which they gesture could be filled out at greater 
length, of course, and would, I think, become more plausible as a result. 
However, even were this elaboration to be supplied, one hugely important 
topic would remain to be addressed. A great deal of sacred music, prob-
ably the vast majority of it, is music with words. Hanslick is clear that his 
arguments are reflections on the nature of instrumental music. Despite 
widespread opinion to the contrary, words and music, he claims, have no 
special affinity with each other. They comprise an essentially “morganatic 
marriage,” with words functioning as a decidedly inferior party. It is not 
easy to see that this could be said of hymns and anthems. From a religious 
point of view, their words would seem to be certainly no less, and possibly 
more important than the music to which they are set. How do the texts of 
sacred music fit into the account of music given here? This is a good, and 
a difficult question, but one for another occasion.27
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24Ibid., 54.
25Henry Scougal, The Life of God in the Soul of Man (1677), ed. Winthrop S. Hudson (Phila-
delphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1947), 29–30.
26Several of the issues are discussed at greater length in my Wittgenstein and Natural 
Religion.
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